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THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ON SECURED FINANCING TRANSACTIONS
AND BANKRUPTCY
MAX SoCWARTZ t
In view of the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code by the State of New York, which goes into effect
on September 27, 1964, it is well that the Bar be aware
of the effect of the provisions of the Code on secured
financing and be prepared and informed in the handling
of security transactions under the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Bankruptcy Act.
The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted at
the present writing by 27 states, including the neighboring
states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut and
Massachusetts.'
The Code was drafted with the intent that it be uniform
in the states adopting its provisions and with the under-
lying thought and hope of its drafters that the interpretation
and construction of its provisions in one state would be
followed in other jurisdictions.
While actual uniformity has not yet been realized,
nevertheless the courts have expressed the thought and the
admonition that the courts of all states should keep in
mind the spirit and object of the Uniform Laws, and give
the language of the Uniform Commercial Code a common
t Member of the firm of Schwartz & Duberstein, 26 Court Street,
Brooklyn, New York; LL.B 1924, New York University; LL.M Summa
Cum Laude 1925, Brooklyn Law School; member of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference; chairman of Committee on Bankruptcy, Brooklyn Bar
Association; member of the Committee on Bankruptcy of the American Bar
Association; member of the Committee on Bankruptcy of the Section of
Corporation, Bankruptcy and Business Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion; Associate Editor of the Commercial Law League Journal.
I Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Arkansas, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Wyoming, Ohio, Illinois, Oklahoma,
New Jersey, Alaska, Georgia, Oregon, Michigan, New York, California,
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construction so that the courts of the various states might
come to the same conclusion.2
The Uniform Commercial Code is of tremendous scope,
covering all phases of commercial law. It is rapidly being
adopted by the states throughout the Union and hence
it is imperative that there be uniformity of interpretation
and application of the provisions of the Code, in order
that there may be certainty with respect to the construction
of its provisions in litigation respecting all elements of
secured transactions, particularly where there are innova-
tions introduced intended to remedy the defects, weaknesses
and gaps in the various statutes that have covered security
transactions heretofore.
The initial decisions interpreting the ,Code become doubly
important as, undoubtedly, they will be the guidestones for
the interpretation of the same provisions in those juris-
dictions that have adopted and will hereafter adopt the
Code.
Souun'Y TRANSACTIONS UNDER _ ARTIOLE 9
The most important article of the Uniform Commercial
Code, insofar as it affects security transactions, is Article
9. This article includes and applies to every kind of
security transaction that is the subject of a voluntary con-
tract between parties creating a consensual lien on personal
property. It replaces present legislation dealing with or
authorizing the creation of security interests or liens by
way of a chattel mortgage, conditional bill of sale, as-
signment of accounts receivable, trust receipt and factor's
lien. In fact, it replaces every type of consensual or con-
tractual lien or encumbrance authorized by any act of
legislation. It likewise applies to leases with the right to
purchase, consignment transactions and security interests
in fixtures attached to real estate. It does not apply to
security interests in personal property arising and perfected
under the federal statutes.
2 Fairbanks Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries, 190 F.2d 817, 822
(3d Cir. 1951); National City Bank v. National Bank of Republic, 300 Ill.
103, 107, 132 N.E. 832, 833 (1921).
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Under the Code, the form of the transaction and the
distinction between the various types of securities, whether
a chattel mortgage, conditional bill of sale, trust receipt or
factor's lien, is immaterial.
New terminology is introduced doing away with the
old familiar terms created by the individual statutes. Some
of the definitions, as set forth in the Code emphasize
the changes sought to be brought about:
(1) "Secured party" - replacing mortgagee, con-
ditional vendor, entruster, factor and assignee--means
a lender, a seller, or other party in whose favor there
is a security interest; 1
(2) "Debtor"--replacing mortgagor, conditional
vendee, trustee and assignee-means the person who
owes payment or other performance of the obligation
secured;4
(3) "Security Interest" - replacing chattel mort-
gage, conditional bill of sale, trust receipt, factor's
lien, assignment of accounts receivable - means an
interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation; '
(4) "Security agreement" means an agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest and
sets forth the arrangement between the secured party
and the debtor; 6
(5) "Collateral" means the property subject to
a security interest, and includes accounts, contract
rights and chattel paper, which have been sold; 1
(6) "Account debtor" means a person who is
obligated on an account, chattel paper or contract
rights; 8
3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(i) (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.).
4 U.C.C. § 9-105(d).
5 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
6 U.C.C. § 9-105(h).
7 U.C.C. § 9-105 (c).
8 U.C.C. § 9-105 (a).
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(7) "Chattel paper" means a writing which evi-
dences a monetary obligation and/or a security in-
terest in, or a lease of specific goods; ' and
(8) "Financing statements" means the document
filed to give public notice.10
Under the Code a security interest is created and
attaches when there is (1) an agreement between the
lender and the debtor; (2) the giving of value by the
secured party; and (3) the acquisition or the ownership
of rights by the debtor in the collateral."
The security interest is perfected through taking phy-
sical possession of the collateral or by the filing of a financing
statement executed by the debtor and the secured creditor,
in accordance with the provisions of the Code.12
Where filing is required to perfect a security instrument
the document filed is called a "Financing Statement."
While all of the elements must be present in order
to have a valid security agreement, the events with respect
to the acquisition of rights in the collateral, the giving of
value, and the execution of the agreement may occur in
any order. The interest, however, attaches only after all
the events have taken place.3 If the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party, the security interest will
be good as against creditors and the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, even though there is no written security agreement.14
Any other type of security interest can only be evidenced
by a security agreement, in writing, signed by the debtor
and, to be valid as against creditors and the trustee in
bankruptcy of the debtor, the security interest must be
perfected by the filing of a financing statement. 5  This,
normally, should take place before the advance of any
value by the secured party.
9 U.C.C. § 9-105(b).10U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
11 U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
12 U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1), 9-302.
13 U.C.C. § 9-303.
14 U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
15 U.C.C. §§ 9-204, 9-302, 9-303.
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Contrary to the present law in New York and the
rules in bankruptcy proceedings, after-acquired property may
be covered by a security agreement. The Code specifically
provides that the security interest in the after-acquired
collateral shall be deemed to have been taken for new
value and not as security for an antecedent debt. 6
Likewise, the Code provides that a security interest
is not void or fraudulent as against creditors by reason
of the rights given to the debtor to use, commingle or
dispose of all or part of the collateral or its proceeds, or
by reason of the failure of the secured party to require
the debtor to account for the proceeds or to replace the
collateral. 7
These provisions with respect to after-acquired property
and the right of the debtor to use, commingle or dispose
of the proceeds or the collateral, are new. In fact, they
are contrary to the provisions in the existing specific statutes
and legislation. Under present state law and the bankruptcy
rules, the security arrangement would be void as against
the trustee in bankruptcy. However, these provisions will
be more fully discussed in the analysis of cases.
The document or writing that must be filed to perfect
the security interest is known as a "financing statement."
It should contain the names, addresses and signatures of
the debtor and the secured party, a description of the type
or items of collateral covered, and a statement that the
proceeds or the products of collateral are claimed as security,
if such is the case. Products may be claimed as security
when raw materials of a manufacturer are financed and
proceeds may be claimed where inventory is financed. It
does not have to be any more elaborate than as outlined
to be a good, effective financing statement, as against cred-
itors, the trustee in bankruptcy and the debtor.' 8
The finaficing statement does not require an acknowledg-
ment or affidavit. The description of the collateral should
b as specific as the situation may permit, so as to reason-
16 U.C.C. §§ 9-108, 9-204.
17 U.C.C. § 9-205.
18 U.C.C. § 9-402.
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ably identify the articles covered.19 Thus, the present
requirement to set forth serial numbers, applicable to
descriptions in chattel mortgages and trust receipts is ren-
dered unnecessary and eliminated.
The Code permits the creation of every kind and nature
of security interest that could be created under pre-Code
law. It still appears to be considered a good basic principle
of operation to follow that which was good in pre-Code law
when entering into security transactions.
Under the provisions of the Code an unperfected se-
curity interest is good as against all creditors, other than a
lien creditor, an assignee for the benefit of creditors and
a trustee in bankruptcy.20 There is no time limitation set
forth in the Code for the filing of the financing statement
or security agreement. Thus, if the transaction is perfected
prior to bankruptcy, regardless of the lapse of time
between the creation of the security interest and its per-
fection by filing, it is good as against any subsequent lien
creditor. In the event of bankruptcy, a serious question
arises, to wit: whether the security interest was filed within
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy with
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe, on the part of
the secured creditor, the insolvency or the imminency of
insolvency on the part of the debtor. In other words, if
the trustee in bankruptcy can establish the elements of a
preference where the filing or perfection of the secured
interest took place within four months of the filing of the
petition, the security interest will be void as to the trustee
in bankruptcy as a preference under Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act. The bankruptcy courts have construed
this section to this effect so that a delay of'more than
twenty-one days in the perfection of a security interest
renders it subject to attack on the ground that it was given
and created for a past consideration.2
It is, therefore, recommended, to avoid any attack on
the security and to preserve its priority over any sub-
'9 U.C.C. §9-110.
20 U.C.C. § 9-301.
21 In re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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sequent lienor or security interest, that the financing state-
ment be filed promptly. If filed within ten days it will,
without question, cut off the possibility of any intervening
right or any intervening creditor to obtain priority. It will
eliminate any possible attack by a trustee in bankruptcy,
under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, by reason of
delayed filing or that the security interest was perfected
after twenty-one days and for a past consideration within
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
while the debtor was insolvent.
The Code also provides for priority to the secured
creditor as against a subsequent transferee in bulk, lien or
secured creditor, if the security interest is perfected by
filing within ten days after the collateral comes into the
possession of the debtor.2
A security interest in chattel paper or negotiable docu-
ments may be perfected by filing.23
A security interest in instruments or negotiable docu-
ments is perfected without filing or taking of possession
for a period of twenty-one days from the time it attaches,
but after the twenty-one day period, perfection depends
upon compliance with the applicable provisions of Article
9.24
If the security interest is not perfected before the
filing of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or the
filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Act, the interest
is void as to the assignee for the benefit of creditors, or
the trustee in bankruptcy. 25
In New York the filing of the financing statement, to
perfect the lien of the secured creditor, must be made with
the Secretary of State at Albany, New York, and, in ad-
dition, if the debtor has a place of business in New York
and in only one county, in the office of the filing officer of
such county.2 6 With respect to the City of New York,
it means filing with the Register of the City of New York,
22 U.C.C. § 9-301(2).
23 U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
24U.C.C. §9-304(4), (5), (6).
25 UG.C § 9-301(2), (3).26 U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (c).
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in the particular county wherein the debtor is located;
in other counties of the state it means filing with the
county clerk of the county."7 With respect to a debtor
that is a domestic corporation, its residence is the county
in which the principal office of the corporation is located,
as designated in its certificate of incorporation.2
With respect to a partnership, its residence is that
county in which the certificate of partnership is fied in the
office of the clerk of the county.
29
A filing made in the proper place continues effective
even though the debtor's residence or place of business or
the location of the collateral is thereafter changed.30 The
filing of a financing statement is effective for a period
of five years from the date of filing unless an earlier maturity
date is stated, in which event, it is effective for a period of
sixty days after the maturity date. The effectiveness of
the financing statement lapses on the expiration of said
period unless a continuation statement is filed which is good
for another five years."1 A continuation statement may be
filed by the secured parties within six months before and
sixty days after a stated maturity date of less than five
years, or within six months prior to the expiration of
the five year period. It must be signed by the secured
party: the original statement must be identified by file
number and a statement made that the original statement
is still effective. Succeeding continuation statements may
be filed in the same manner. If no continuation statement
is filed before the end of the effective period, the effective-
ness of the statement lapses, and the security interest
becomes unperfected.32
In summary, a security agreement is any agreement
between the debtor and a secured creditor in which the
debtor agrees that the secured party is to have a security
interest in personal property. It has to describe the
27 U.C.C. §9-401(1) (a), (d).
28 U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (e), (i).
29 U.C.C. § 9-401 (e) (i).
30 U.C.C. § 9-401(3).
31 U.C.C. § 9-403(2), (3).
32 U.C.C. § 9-403(3).
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collateral that it is securing. It makes no difference in
whom title to the property is vested. The secured party
acquires a security interest in the property by virtue of
the security agreement, which, if perfected by timely filing,
is good as against any subsequent transferee, levying
creditor or trustee in bankruptcy. The security interest
may be taken to secure advances to be made in the future.
An unperfected security interest is good as against every-:
one except another secured party who perfects first and
who had no notice of the earlier secured interest, or an
actual lien creditor, or a trustee in bankruptcy. The state-
ment. must contain the signatures and addresses of both
the secured party and the debtor.
The section of the Code that is perhaps of greatest
imnortance to those dealing in secured financing is section
9-306. This is the section spelling out the nature and extent
of the secured party's interest in the proceeds derived from
the disposition of the collateral, whether sold, exchanged or
otherwise disposed of. 8
The security interest continues in the collateral not-
withstanding the disposition of the same by the debtor, and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds, including col-
lections received by the debtor. 4 The security interest
in the proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest
but it ceases to be perfected and becomes unperfected ten
days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor, unless
the financing statement covering the original collateral also
covers the proceeds. 5
In the event of insolvency proceedings (which would
include assignments for the benefit of creditors, as well
as proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act) a secured party
with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a per-
fected security interest in identifiable non-cash proceeds,
which would be any proceeds other than money, checks
or the like;" s in identifiable cash proceeds not com-
33U.C.C. §9-306(1).
34 U.C.C. § 9-306 (2).
5 U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
36 U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (a).
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mingled; ", in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of
checks and the lile, not deposited; 8 and in all cash and
bank accounts of the debtor that have been commingled
and deposited in the bank account. The right of the secured
party as to these latter funds is subject to the right of
set off and limited to the amount of cash proceeds received
by the debtor within ten days before the institution of
the insolvency proceedings, and deposited in the bank ac-
count less the amount of cash proceeds received by the
debtor and paid over to the secured creditor, during the ten
day period. 9
Section 9-306 is derived from Section 10 of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, which has been subject to much con-
troversy, giving rise to conflicting opinions. It is important
to note, however, that cash and non-cash proceeds can be
claimed under a perfected security interest against a trustee
in bankruptcy so long as they are identifiable, regardless of
the time of their receipt. 40  The security interest enforceable
as against the trustee in bankruptcy as to proceeds which
are not identifiable and which have been commingled or
deposited in a bank account is limited to the amount of the
cash received within ten days of the filing of the bankruptcy
proceedings.4' This provision is now applicable not only
to situations formerly limited solely to trust receipt trans-
actions but to every type of security interest and transaction.
In order to create a security interest, valid under
the Code and good as against the trustee in bankruptcy it
will be necessary to adhere to and comply strictly with
the provisions of the 'Code with respect to the attachment
and perfection of the security interest, and even though there
is strict compliance with these provisions, it is essential to
be mindful of the provisions of Sections 60 and 70(c), (e)
37 UC.C.§ 9-306(4) (b).
38 U.C.C. § 9-306 (4) (c).
39 U.C.C. § 9-306 (4) (d) (i), (ii).4 0 Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (N.D.
Pa. 1962).
41 In re Harpeth Motors, 135 F. Supp. 863, 868 (M.D. Tenn. 1955);
English v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 278 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1960).
Contra, In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied sub. nwn., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Allen, 363 U.S. 811 (1960).
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of the Bankruptcy Act and their effect upon the provisions
of the Code.
THE EFFEmT OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROVISIONS
ON TE CODE
Notwithstanding any statement or provision in the
Code,4 2 to the effect that the Bankruptcy Act supplements
the provisions of the Code, the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act are paramount to the provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, just as the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
are paramount to the state laws with respect to any par-
ticular secured transaction or consensual lien. If there is
a conflict between the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
and the provisions of the Code, the Code must be held
to be subordinate and yield to the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.43
Under the "Supremacy Clause" of the Constitution,
federal policy is paramount in the field of bankruptcy.
States are not permitted by legislation to establish prior-
ities contravening Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act or
establish statutory liens in violation of Section 67 of the
Bankruptcy Act.4 4 It is, therefore, esseitial when entering
into secured transactions that the secured creditor be mindful
and take note of the provisions of Sections 60and 70 of the
Bankruptcy Act which give rise to rights on the part
of the trustee in bankruptcy to challenge and attack the
validity of a secured transaction.
45
The present Bankruptcy Act, though amended many
times since its enactment in 1898, still gives rise to a
tremendous amount of litigation respecting the validity of
secured transactions. The litigation covers every type
of security- chattel mortgages, conditional bills of sale,
assignments of accounts, trust receipts, factors' liens and
warehousemen's liens-notwithstanding the fact that secured
42 U.C.C. § 1-103.
43 National Foundry Co. v. Director of Int. Rev., 229 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.
1956); MAcLAUGHLIN, BANKRUPTCY § 117 (1956).
44 In re Crosstown Motors Corp., supra note 41; National Foundry Co.
v. Director of Int. Rev., supra note 43.45 Bankruptcy Act §§60(a) (1), (2), (7), (8), 70(c), (e).
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creditors and their attorneys have had ample opportunity
to familiarize themselves with the provisions and the statutes
authorizing the secured transactions, and the benefit of
judicial decisions interpreting the legislation authorizing
the transactions. It is the hope of the draftsmen of the
Code that greater protection will be accorded to the secured
creditor and the volume of litigation materially reduced.
Under pre-Code law, the attack of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy upon a secured transaction in connection with as-
signment of accounts was primarily based upon retention
of unfettered dominion and control on the part of the
assignor," the failure to police the secured transaction
47
46Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); In re New Haven Clock &
Watch Co. (First National Bank v. O'Keefe), 253 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1958). In this excellent and exhaustive opinion the court found
that there was adequate policing of the assigned accounts, that there was
no reservation of dominion and control on the part of the assignor and
distinguished factually as well as legally Benedict v. Ratner. It upheld
the assignment as against the attack of the trustee under § 67(2) but in-
dicated however, that the provision for attorneys' fees might be subordinated
to the lien of the government for taxes, if the government's lien was per-
fected prior to the attorneys' lien becoming choate. There had to be strict
adherence to the terms of the security agreement, and where there was an
arrangement for the substitution of collateral, the new had to be substituted
for the old before the proceeds of the old collateral could be retained by the
assignor in order to avoid the effect of Benedict v. Ratner, and to preserve
the validity of the security as against the trustee in bankruptcy. See also
Walker v. Commercial Bank of Little Rock, 217 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1954).
471n re Crosstown Motors Corp., supra note 41; McCloskey v. Henry
Schroder Banking Corp., 7 Misc. 2d 501, 168 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Assignments of account have been adjudged invalid as against a trustee
in bankruptcy by reason of failure to police the assignments, particularly
with respect to return of merchandise. Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co.,
38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930), modified, 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 547 (1932). See, also, Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926);
Bloch v. Mill Factors Corp., 134 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1943).
Assignments made under a master factoring agreement to the extent of
being for a past consideration have been held void as to the trustee in
bankruptcy while those for a present advance have been held to be valid.
In re Ace Fruit & Produce Co., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
Assignments under a factoring agreement are valid and apply to all
claims as against all indebtedness owing up to the point and date where the
secured creditor acquires knowledge of the debtor's insolvency. As to all
assignments made prior to knowledge of insolvency, the secured creditor has
a right to apply all security held as against the entire indebtedness owing
regardless of the individual amount of the advances or the dates thereof.
The assignment and the security arrangement is valid only to the extent of
the present actual advance made. Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 126 F. Supp.
872 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1955).
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and the taking of present security for a past consideration .4
With respect to chattel mortgages and conditional bills of
sale, the attack was based upon either delay in filing,4
9
failure to file in the proper places as required by the
statute, or failure to comply with the statutory provisions
with respect to the execution and filing of the instrument.61
With respect to trust receipts, factors' liens and ware-
housemen's liens, the same grounds of attack were present,
to wit: failure to comply with the statutory provisions
with respect to the execution and the filing of the same,
52
48 The rights of the parties are to be determined by what they actually
do rather than by the provisions of a contract which they may disregard.
Mount v. Norfolk Savings & Loan Corp., 192 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1951).
49 1n re Morasco, 233 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1956); Oliver Machinery Co. v.
Bissell, 261 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
O In re Steen, 257 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1958), wherein the court held a
conditional bill of sale void by reason of the failure to comply with the
laws of Texas, to which state the chattels were originally delivered, even
though they had been removed and were in the State of Illinois at the
time of bankruptcy, and Illinois law did not require the filing of a condi-
tional bill of sale. The validity of the assignment of accounts was sustained
where the assignment had been filed in accordance with state law and the
assignor had not retained unfettered dominion and control over the proceeds
of the collections, Second National Bank v. Phillips, 189 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.
1951).
51The right of a trustee to attack the validity of an assignment of
accounts receivable under state law is based upon the exercise of the rights
of creditors under the provisions of § 70(c) and (e) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Costello v. Bank of America National Trust & Say. Ass'n, 246 F.2d 807
(9th Cir. 1957); Blackford v. Commercial Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97
(5th Cir. 1959).
The failure to file a conditional bill of sale in the county of the resi-
dence of each partner where the purchase is made renders the same void as
against the trustee in bankruptcy for failure to comply with the filing
requirements of the state law, Weingarten v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
302 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1962).
52 The Factor's Lien Act is not applicable to an extension of credit for
goods or merchandise sold and a factor's lien granted to the manufacturer
of shoes by the purchaser thereof was void as against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy as the Factor's Lien Act is applicable only to secure moneys loaned
and advances made. In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J.
1959); In re Freeman, 294 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1961).
As to what constitutes a field warehousing lien, see Lawrence Warehouse
Co. v. McKee, 301 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1962), wherein the court defined a
warehouse lien as an arrangement whereby a wholesaler, manufacturer or
merchant finances his business through the pledge of goods remaining in and
on his premises. It is a limited type of warehousing as distinguished from
public warehousing. Normally, the lien is coupled with a field warehousing
arrangement whereunder a warehousing company is employed by the debtor
to establish and operate a field warehouse as to merchandise in the premises
of the debtor. To have a valid field warehousing lien good as against a
trustee in bankruptcy there must be policing and the debtor must not retain
[ VOL. 38
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time filing,5" failure to police,54 and retention of unfettered
dominion or control of the collateral by the debtor.5
Secured transactions and particularly assignments of
accounts were frequently and successfully challenged by a
trustee in bankruptcy under the rule of Benedict v. Ratner 11
that the secured transaction was void as to the trustee in
bankruptcy by reason of the fact that the debtor was deemed
to have retained unfettered dominion and control over the
security. This was based upon the right and the opportunity
afforded the debtor to use and commingle the proceeds
resulting from the disposition or liquidation of the collateral,
whether the same consisted of accounts receivable or
chattels. This same rule was invoked if the debtor had
the right to dispose of returned merchandise and commingle
and use the same in the conduct of his business. 7
dominion and control over the collateral or its proceeds. Bostian v. Park
Nat'l Bank, 226 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1955); Swetnamn v. Edmund Wright
Ginsberg Corp., 128 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1942); Ribaudo v. Citizens Nat'l Bank,
261 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958) ; In re United Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F.2d 316
(7th Cir. 1960).
53 In re Kessler, 90 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Cal. 1950); In re Francino's
Grill, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Coller, 106 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1939) ; Zamore v. Goldblatt, 194 F.2d
933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952).
54 In re United Wholesalers, Inc., supra note 52.
55 Bostian v. Park Nat'l Bank, supra note 52; Swetnam v. Edmund
Wright Ginsberg -Corp., supra note 52; In re United Wholesalers, Inc.,
supra note 52.
56 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
57 See Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930),
modified, 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 547 (1932),
with respect to the rights of creditors under state law and the right of a
trustee to exercise the same under the provisions of §70(c) and (e).
It should be noted that assignments of accounts receivable made after
the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy but before adjudication,
even for a present consideration, have been held to be void as against
the trustee in bankruptcy under § 70(d) (3) unless authorized by the
bankruptcy court, In re Autocue Sales & Distributing Corp., 162 F. Supp. 17
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd mtb. nmn., Kohn v. Myers, 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir.
1959). Assignment of accounts receivable to become due in the future under
a contract presently in existence is a valid and legally enforceable assign-
ment as against a trustee in bankruptcy. In re Luscombe Engineering Co.,
268 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1959). Distinguishing what is after-acquired property
from property in existence and an assignment valid as against a trustee,
see Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942), reversing, 128 F.2d
564 (2d Cir. 1942) to the effect that assignments of existing contracts are
to be distinguished from an agreement to assign rights not yet in being and
that an assignment of an existing contract under which moneys will become
due in the future is valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy. To the
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Other transactions and particularly those involving
chattel mortgages and .onditional bills of sale were chal-
lenged as void as against the trustee in bankruptcy if the
instruments were filed and recorded more than twenty-one
days after execution or if they were not executed and
filed strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions
authorizing the same."
same effect see Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 221 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1955);
Malone v. Bolstein, 151 F. Supp. 544 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 244 F.2d 954
(2d Cir. 1957).
58 In re Morasco, supra note 49.
Failure to file the chattel mortgage or conditional bill of sale was not
cured by taking possession or repossessing the property. The act of
repossession was not retroactive but the perfection of the lien and if it
took place within four months of the filing of the petition with knowledge
of insolvency, then such act would be a preference under § 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act. In re Huston, 143 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ohio 1956);
England v. Moore Equipment Co., 94 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1950);
Tyler State Bank & Trust v. Bullington, 179 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1950).
However, actual possession fulfills the requirement of filing and dispenses
with the need of filing either as to a chattel mortgage or a warehouse
receipt Union Bank & Trust v. Azar, 316 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1963).
A chattel mortgage or a conditional bill of sale has to be filed in the
county designated as the principal place of business in the certificate of
incorporation in addition to the county where the chattels are located to be
valid as against a trustee in bankruptcy. Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571
(Zd Cir. 1954); In re Norma Footwear Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 24, 153
N.Y.S.2d 80 (1st Dep't 1956); In re Savage Mills, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 559
(E.D.N.Y. 1959).
With respect to chattel mortgages and conditional bills of sale, the
entire agreement or instrument constituting the chattel mortgage or condi-
tional bill of sale has to le filed to be valid as against a trustee in bank-
ruptcy. Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 815 (1950). Chattel mortgages and conditional bills of sale like-
wise have been held void for failure to file in accordance with the state
law, particularly with respect to the filing of conditional bills of sale in
the respective counties of residence of the individual partners. Virshup v.
Industrial Bank of Commerce, 272 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1959); Weingarten v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., supra note 51. The failure to comply with
state law as to the statement of the consideration paid for a chattel mortgage
renders the same void as to a trustee in bankruptcy. Basic Tool Industries,
Inc. v. Wikle, 298 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1961). Failure to properly renew a
chattel mortgage renders the same void and if void as to one creditor, it
was void as to all creditors under the rule of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4(1931); In re ETC, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Mich. 1961); Zamore v.
Goldblatt, supra note 53. Failure to set forth the correct serial numbers of
a machine would render a chattel mortgage void as to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, In re Marshall Engineering Co., 213 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Me. 1963).
With respect to leases with an option to purchase or the right to receive a
deed or bill of sale on final payment, the courts have held such a trans-
action to be a conditional bill of sale, First Natl Bank v. Phillips,
261 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1958); In re Midwest Airmoving Corp., 277 F.2d
792 (6th Cir. 1960); American Can Co. v. United States Canning Co.,
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Secured transactions are also subject to attack by the
trustee under the rule of Moore v. Bay " holding that if
the secured transaction is void as to one creditor it is
void as to the aggregate of the claims of all creditors.20
Prior to the Code the business community and par-
ticularly banks and finance companies sought an arrangement
whereby the bank or finance company could safely advance
money and be protected by a valid security in a transaction
whereunder the buyer purchased merchandise either for
processing, manufacturing or for resale. If the bank or
finance company sought to utilize, as security, inventory
which the buyer was free to use and sell, the result usually
was that in the event of the ensuing bankruptcy of the
buyer, the lender (bank or finance company) would find the
trustee in bankruptcy of the buyer prevailing over the
claimed security.
If the parties resorted to a two-party transaction, that
is, the buyer-dealer and the finance company, the trans-
action, even though designated as a trust receipt trans-
action, was uniformly struck down and held null and void
as against the trustee in bankruptcy, on the ground that
the transaction was a chattel mortgage, based upon the
fact that the buyer was the owner of the goods and the
security he gave to the bank was a lien on his own personal
property. Being a lien, it was deemed to be a chattel
mortgage, which was void unless filed in compliance with
the requirements of the state law.61
15 Misc. 2d 549, 180 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd mer., 9 App.
Div. Zd 746 (1st Dep't 1959).
A lease with an option to purchase is deemed to be a conditional bill of
sale and unless filed in accordance with state law is void as to a trustee in
bankruptcy. In re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
For failure to refile a conditional bill of sale on the removal of the
property from California to New York, the conditional bill of sale was
held void as against the trustee in bankruptcy. Brown v. American Trust
Co., 186 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
59284 U.S. 4 (1931).60 Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Zamore v. Goldblatt,
supra note 53.
, In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 (D. Ore. 1948); In ?-e San Clemente
Electric Supply, 101 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Cal. 1951); B-W Acceptance Corp.
v. Colley, 256 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1958); Taube v. Ingraham, 290 F.2d 288
(8th Cir. 1961).
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Trust receipt financing came into use and was employed
originally in connection with importing transactions, where
the goods were directly consigned by the seller to the bank
or finance company, which paid the draft and released the
merchandise to the buyer under a pledge or security title
arrangement. As it has developed, a trust receipt is ei-
sentially a security interest whereby the financer of the
purchase of the merchandise takes title to the inventory
but delivers possession of the same to the buyer-dealer on
the latter's receipt that the inventory is held in trust
pending payment to the financer.62
The trust receipt transaction is to be distinguished
from a consignment transaction. The consignment trans-
action creates the relationship of principal and agent. There
is no obligation on the part of the consignee to pay for the
merchandise. He is not the buyer. Title does not come
from the consignee but from the consignor to the purchaser.'
In a trust receipt transaction, there is a sale subject
to the terms and conditions of the financing agreement.
The sales price is fixed between the entruster (bank or
finance company) and the buyer-dealer, as trustee. Upon
the sale of the merchandise the excess over the invoice price
belongs to and is the property of the dealer. Title flows
from the dealer to the purchaser.64
Prior to the adoption of the Code there was no pro-
vision for the filing of any documents respecting a con-
signment transaction. It was a transaction that created a
secret lien, and was valid as against the trustee in
bankruptcy.6
5
Under the Code a consignment transaction is deemed
to be a security transaction,6" and must be perfected by
62 Discussing two-party and three-party trust receipt transactions and the
need for filing in accordance with state laws in a state where the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act has not been adopted, even though filed in the state
where the trust receipt transactions took place, see Chattanooga Discount
Corp. v. West, 219 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
63 I1 re Lexington Appliance Co., 202 F. Supp. 869 (D. Md. 1962).
64 A trust receipt transaction does not apply to a single transaction
whether of a loan or a sale of merchandise, Sammet v. Mayer, 108 F.2d 337
(2d Cir. 1939).
65 Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522 (1913); Liebowitz v.
Voiello, 107 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1939).
66U.C.C. §2-326(3).
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the filing of the financing statement required of all security
financing, in order to protect the security interest.0 7  Failure
to file the requisite notice to protect the security interest
will render the transaction void as against the trustee in
bankruptcy.6 8
Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act there had to
be compliance with the provisions with respect to filing
within twenty-one days,69 refiling,70 policing,71 description 2
and identification 71 of the collateral subject to the trust
receipt, for failure of any one of which the transaction would
be held void as against the trustee in bankruptcy. There
was also considerable litigation regarding the interpretation
of Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 4 which
has been considerably clarified and improved in the present
Code, under the provisions of Section 9-306(4).
Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act provides
that the entruster (the finance company) shall have a
security interest in and to the proceeds or the value of
the proceeds, whether identifiable or not, of the goods,
documents and instruments subject to the trust receipt, if
said proceeds were received by the trustee (the borrower-
bankrupt) within ten days prior to either an application
for the appointment of a receiver of the trustee (borrower)
6 7 U.C.C. § 9-302.
681n re Schepler, (D.C. Pa.) CCH 60255.
69 General Electric Credit Corp. v. Davis, 224 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1955).
70 In re Lexington Appliance Co., supra note 63, wherein at the end of
the year the finance company failed to refile the trust receipt financing
statement and during the next ensuing year the dealer became a bankrupt
and the court held that the failure to refile rendered the trust receipt void as
against the trustee.
71 McCloskey v. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 7 Misc. 2d 501, 168
N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1957), wherein the court held that the trust receipt
transaction must be policed with respect to the dispositior of the proceeds
of the sale of the merchandise in order to preserve the lien, and for failure
to do so, the transaction was void and the bank a general unsecured creditor.72 1n re Nikulas, 117 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md.), aff'd sub. nora., Tatelbaum
v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 212 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1954); In. re A A
Appliance & TV Center, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 271 F.2d
800 (7th Cir. 1959).
73 In re Yost, 107 F. Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1952).
74 In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied sub. non., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Allen, 363 U.S. 811 (1960);
In re Harpeth Motors, 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955); English v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 278 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960).
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or the filing of a petition in bankruptcy or judicial insol-
vency proceedings by or against the trustee (borrower)
or demand made by the entruster for prompt accounting
and to a priority to the amount of such proceeds or
value.
This provision in In re Crosstown Motors, Inc.,7 5 was
held to create merely a priority which was valid under state
law, if asserted promptly and prior to the filing of the
petition. The priority was lost and void as against the
trustee in bankruptcy under the provisions of Section 64
of the Bankruptcy Act, for the reason that the statute
attempted to create a priority which was in contravention
to and void as in violation of Sections 60 and 64 of the
Bankrupti-y Act.
The ruling of the court emphasized the need of strict
policing of the secured transaction, the obligation to make
frequent audits with prompt demands and action if any
trust receipt property was found to have been sold out of
trust and no proper accounting made for the proceeds.
In the Crosstown Motors case the court also set aside
a trust receipt given in partial satisfaction of the borrower-
bankrupt's obligations for the proceeds of the sale of cars
previously disposed of upon the ground that the new security
constituted a voidable preference in that the new trust
receipt was given for a past consideration within four months
of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and at a time
when the borrower-bankrupt was insolvent and the finance
company had knowledge of the insolvent condition.
The court further held that the provision with respect
to a lien upon the proceeds deposited in the bankrupt's
bank account within ten days of the bankruptcy constituting
a trust fund without tracing its funds merely created a
priority void as against the trustee under Sections 64 and
67(c) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act. On appeal the United
States Court of Appeals held that the provisions of Section
10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act created only a priority
right and not a lien right.
75 In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., supra note 74
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In In re Harpeth Motors,76 section 10 was held to
create a lien right in the trustee-finance company, which
was good as against the trustee in bankruptcy.
The ruling in the Crosstown Motors case was not
followed in the subsequent case of English v. Universal
C.LT. Corp.,77 which approved of and followed the iarpeth
ruling that the entruster finance company did have a lien
on the proceeds deposited within ten days of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Perhaps the conflict in decisions is
not irreconcilable and may be explained by reason of the
fact that the court in the Harpeth Motors decision deemed
that the state legislature, in enacting the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, intended by section 10 to create a lien right
in the entruster finance company rather than a mere priority.
Hence, the provision gave rise to a consensual lien just
as in the case of a lien created by a chattel mortgage,
conditional bill of sale or trust receipt pursuant to state
statute.
The ruling in the Crosstown Motors case may be ex-
plained by the specific language in the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act adopted in Illinois and the history and intent
of the provision of section 10 of that act. The referee
in bankruptcy, who initially passed upon the issues in
Crosstown Motors, referred to the construction given Section
10 of the Tennessee Trust Receipts Act by the district court
of Tennessee in the Harpeth Motors case; the Tennessee
Legislature had intended to create a lien both on the pro-
ceeds derived from sale and on all other assets of the bank-
rupt. The referee found, however, that the Illinois Leg-
islature did' not intend to create a lien valid against the
rights of the trustee in bankruptcy or against the general
assets of the bankrupt. Section 10 of the llinois Act was
only intended to create a preference or priority in the dis-
tribution of such assets.
Hence, the distinction in the decisions- in the Cross-
town Motors case, the court construed the lrovisions of
Section 10 of the Illinois Uniform Trust Receipts Act as
761n re Harpeth Motors, supra note 74.
77English v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., supra note 74.
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creating merely a priority in accordance with the intent
and purpose of the state legislature. In the Harpeth Motors
case it was found that the intent and purpose of the state
legislature in enacting Section 10 of the Tennessee Trust
Receipts Act was to create a lien.
The more sound view with respect to the intent and
purposes and effect of Section 10 of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act appears to be expressed In re Harpeth Motors
and English v. Universal C.I.T. as the provisions of the stat-
ute give rise to the consensual lien just as any other lien
created or authorized by state law. Section 9-306(4) of
the Code by its provisions creates a consensual lien, valid
under state law and which should be good as against a
trustee in bankruptcy.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CODE BY THE BANKRUPTOY CoURTS
Notwithstanding the great hopes held out by the new
provisions of the Code, there have been a number of decisions
in the bankruptcy courts striking down secured transactions
at the instance of trustees in bankruptcy. Thus as there
had been considerable litigation with respect to the place of
filing of a chattel mortgage or conditional bill of sale, so
too, there is considerable litigation with respect to the place
of filing of the financing statement under the Code. Like-
wise, the other provisions of the Code have been the subject
of scrutiny by the bankruptcy courts. An examination of
the cases indicates that the bankruptcy courts have sustained
the validity and given effect to the changes sought to be
effected by the provisions of the Code, notwithstanding the
fact that they may be at complete variance with prior state
legislation and case law.
Filing - Perfection - Sections 9-109 and 9-401
In the case of In re Shepler,78 farm implement chattels
were shipped by the manufacturer to the debtor-bankrupt,
on consignment. Upon the ensuing bankruptcy, the trustee
in bankruptcy sought to have the consignment arrangement
78 1960-62 BANKR. L. REP.-f 60355 (1962).
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adjudged null and void, by reason of the failure of the
manufacturer to file the proper security instruments, on
the ground that the chattels came within the meaning of
section 9-109 of the Code and were subject to its filing
provisions. The court held that the consignment arrange-
ment between the manufacturer and the bankrupt. was void
by reason of the failure to file the required financing state-
ment under section 9-401 (1) (a), and accordingly held that
the manufacturer was a general unsecured creditor of the
bankrupt estate.
This case merely illustrates the need for compliance
with the provisions of the Code, particularly with respect to
the filing of the financing statement to protect the security
interest.
As to the need for strict compliance, the court, in the
case of In re Excel Stores., Inc.,79 presented with the question
as to the validity of the security interest created by an
instrument purporting to be a conditional sale contract
signed and fled against "Excel Department Stores" whereas
the real and actual name of the corporation was "Excel
Stores, Inc.," held that the instrument was void as a
security interest under the Connecticut Commercial Code
as the misnomer of the corporate entity constituted a
material variance sufficient to mislead creditors relying upon
the public record.
In the case of In re Kane,80 the financing statement
filed by the alleged secured creditor was a photocopy of
the financing statement. The court held that under the
Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code this was not in
compliance with the signature requirements of the financing
statement required to be filed, by reason of which the in-
strument was void as against the trustee, in bankruptcy.
In the case of In re Lua's Superette, Inc.,81 the bank-
rupt had bought certain merchandise delivered subject to
79 2 BANKCR. L. REP. (4th ed. 60864 1963).80 1960-62 BANKR. L. REP. 60531 (1962).
81 206 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa. 1962). As to what constitutes consumers'
goods as distinguished from inventory requiring perfection of a security
instrument by filing, see Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren
Lepley Ford, Inc., (No. 1), 12 Pa. D. & C. 2d 351 (Phil. County Ct. 1957);
(No. 2), 13 Pa. D. & C. 119 (Phil. County Ct. 1957); (No. 3), 25 Pa.
D. & C. 395 (Phil. County Ct. 1958).
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a conditional bill of sale, which was assigned to the Com-
mercial Credit Corporation. On the bankruptcy of the
buyer the finance company sought to reclaim the chattels
claiming the purchase order was filed as a financing state-
ment with the Prothonotary of Lehigh -County and another
financing statement filed with the Prothonotary of North-
hampton County, Pennsylvania, in compliance with the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code.
In finding that the security interest was unperfected
and void as against the trustee, the *ourt said:
A security interest in equipment as was involved herein is perfected
under the Uniform Commercial Code by filing a finance statement.
The present transactions occurred prior to the effective date of the
1959 Amendments to the Code. Section 9-401(1)(a) as it then
existed provided that proper filing ... must be completed with the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, and if the debtor's business is in a
single county, then also with the prothonotary of that county.
Petitioners . . . failed to file the financing statement with the
Secretary of the Commonwealth.8 2
The finance company also raised the defense of good
faith filing under the provisions of section 9-401 (2). This
defense was rejected on the ground that for the finance
company to succeed it would have to show either proper
filing or knowledge of the existence of the security interest
on the part of all creditors. This the finance company
did not do and the court accordingly held the security
interest not perfected.
In the case of In re Smith,83 the court was confronted
with a reclamation proceeding in which the issue was
raised as to the validity of the security interest of the
finance company under the provisions of the Code in Penn-
sylvania. The security interest was evidenced by a con-
ditional sales contract, which had been filed with the Pro-
thonotary of Berks County where the debtor did business,
but had never been filed in the office of the Secretary of
the Commonwealth. The Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial
Code provides that a security interest in chattels or equip-
ment, to be perfected, must be filed in the office of the
82 I re Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
83 205 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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Secretary of the Commonwealth and in the office of the
prothonotary in the county in which the debtor does business.
The finance company had tendered a financing statement
for filing with the Secretary of the Commonwealth which
statement failed to set forth the debtor's address, by reason
of which it was returned to the finance company. The
statement was never resubmitted for filing, even though
the secretary's office had enclosed a form of financing
statement to be filled out, advising that there had been
no mailing address for the debtor on the original statement.
On these facts the court held that there was a failure on
the part of the financing company to comply with the
filing provisions of the Code; the security interest had not
been perfected, and by reason thereof it was void as against
the trustee as the burden was on the finance company
to show that there had been compliance in all respects
with the provisions of the Code, to perfect the security
interest.
In the case of In re Dumont-Airplane i Marine In-
struments, 4 the court was confronted with the question of
the validity of the security interest, under the 'Uniform
Commercial Code in Pennsylvania, with respect to chattels
that had been removed from West Virginia to Pennsylvania.
A chattel deed of trust was recorded in West Virginia in
connection with the sale of chattels. Upon the removal
of these chattels, with the consent of the mortgagee, to
Pennsylvania, the mortgagee filed a chattel deed in the
office of the Prothonotary of Fairfield County, Pennsylvania,
but did not file a chattel deed or financing statement with
the Secretary of the Commonwealth. 8
In the bankruptcy proceeding the trustee questioned
the validity of the security interest and the court held that
Pennsylvania law was controlling and as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code required re-recording for the protection of
the security interest on property in the state that was
subject to a valid security interest in another state and as
the filing was recuired within four months after the property
84203 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
85 U.C.C. § 9-401; Churchill Motors, Inc. v. Lohman, Inc., 16 App.
Div. 2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (4th Dep't 1962).
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was brought into Pennsylvania, and as the security interest
had not been perfected because of the failure to file the
financing statement with the Secretary of the Commonwealth
as required by the Code, the security interest and chattel
mortgage was void as against the trustee and under section
70(c) the trustee was vested with the right of a lien creditor
as to whom the security interest of the mortagee was void."
These cases illustrate the need for strict compliance
with the provisions of the Code with respect to the manner
and places of filing of the financing statement in order to
protect the security interest. In effect these cases follow
the prior case law with respect to the strict requirements
imposed by the court regarding the filing, the places of
filing of chattel mortgages, conditional bills of sale and
other security instruments.
Time of Filing - Section 9-301
Perhaps a case of first impression interpreting the
provisions of the Code with respect to the time of filing
or perfecting of a security interest is in In re Smith,8 7
which follows the prior case law with respect to the ef-
fect of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act upon secured
transactions. There a security agreement and financing
statement in connection with the sale of air conditioning
and heating equipment was executed on September 30, 1960.
The secured creditor discounted the security agreement and
financing statement with a bank. When the installments
were not paid, the secured creditor repurchased the papers
86 Other cases holding the security interest unperfected and void as to
the trustee either for failure to file or for failure to file with the secretary
of state, and also in the local office of the county where the debtor does
business, as required by the provisions of the Code: In the Matter of
Luckenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957); In re Babcock Box Co., 200
F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1962). The assignment to a surety of moneys due
and to become due the subcontractor under his contract to the surety in
connection with bonds furnished by the surety was a contract right under
§ 9-301, and if not perfected by filing under §§ 9-302 and 9-403, was invalid
as against lien creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy. United States v.
G. P. Fleetwood & Co., 165 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
87205 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1962). For cases interpreting §§ 9-301 and
9-302, see Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc.,
(No. 1), supra note 81; (No. 2), supra note 81.
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from the bank and discovered that the documents had not
been filed in accordance with Section 9-401 of the Penn-
sylvania Uniform Commercial Code. The secured creditor
immediately filed the necessary papers in the office of the
Prothonotary for Berks County and in the office of the
Secretary of the Commonwealth. The filing took place
on August 25, 1961. On August 28, 1961, the bankrupts
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and were adjudicated
on that day.
The court held that the filing of the security interest
put the secured creditor in the status of a lien creditor
to reclaim its property from the bankrupt's estate, but as
the filing took place three days before the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy and adjudication, it examined into
the anestion of a preference being present under Section
60(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Act.
The court found that the filing of the security interest
three days before the bankruptcy constituted a "transfer"
under section 60(a) and (b) and as the debt covered by
the security interest was created eleven months prior thereto,
the transfer was for a past indebtedness.8
The court also found that the transfer was made while
the bankrupt was insolvent; that the transfer enabled the
secured creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than other creditors of the same class; that the petitioner had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent
at the time the transfer was made, and accordingly held
that the delay in the filing, which was over eleven months,
rendered the security interest voidable by the trustee as a
preferential transfer.8 9
This case illustrates that delay in filing of the financial
statement can be fatal to the securit.. It is the first
interpretation of the provisions of section 9-301. It em-
phasizes the need strictly to observe not only the provisions
of the Code, but also the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Just as chattel mortgages and conditional bills of sale filed
88 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a).
89 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(7)(b); In re Morasco, 233 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1956).
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after twenty-one days were deemed to have been given for
a past consideration under Section 60(2), (7) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, so will a security interest under the provisions
of the Code be deemed to have been given for a past con-
sideration and will be voidable at the instance of a trustee
in bankruptcy, unless the financing statement is filed and
security interest perfected within twenty-one days of the
giving of value by the secured creditor (in order to av6id
the effects of section 60 and its subdivisions).
Sufficiency of Description- Section 9-110
It has been indicated that the provisions of the Code
are much more lenient in connection with describing col-
lateral subject to the secured instrument and this is il-
lustrated in the decision of In re Drane9 0 There the court
was presented with the question as to the sufficiency of the
description of the chattels covered by the security interest
under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in
effect in Kentucky.
The Kentucky Code, similar to the New York Code,
provides that the financing statement contain a description
of the personal property covered, which is sufficient whether
or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is
described. Here the mortgage described the furniture as a
two-piece living room suite, a five-piece chrome dinette set
and a three-piece panel bedroom suite in the home of the
debtor, citing his address. The court held this was a
sufficient description and that the security interest was good
as against the trustee."
90202 F. Supp 221 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
91 Also holding the description sufficient and the use of serial numbers
unnecessary, National Dime Bank v. Cleveland Bros., 20 Pa. D. & C. 2d 511
(1959). As to the sufficiency of the description of the property in a financing
statement, see Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford,
Inc., (No. 2), supra note 87, wherein the court held that listing of
articles by serial number was unnecessary and a general description sufficient.
The financing statement covering all present and future accounts re-
ceivable was held to sufficiently identify the collateral security so as to be
good against lien creditors and a trustee in bankruptcy. Industrial Packaging,
Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc., 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19
(1960).
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After-Acquired Property and Commingling of Funds Under
Sections 9-108, 9-204, 9-205 and 9-306
A very interesting decision analyzing at length and
interpreting the provisions of Sections 9-108, 9-204, 9-205 and
9-306, of the Code is Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp.2 In this proceeding the trustee instituted an action
against U.C.I.T. to recover preferential payments and prefer-
ences made within four months of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy, under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. An
involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the
automobile dealer on January 6, 1958, upon which it was
adjudicated a bankrupt on February 13, 1958. Prior to
bankruptcy and on February 5, 1957, a loan agreement had
been executed by U.C.I.T. with the dealer under which it
advanced to the dealer $75,000, and the dealer executed
a chattel mortgage covering certain chattels. U.C.I.T. pro-
tected its security interest in these chattels by filing a
financing statement in accordance with the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Prior to September 28, 1957,
the dealer also executed, in favor of the U.C.I.T. used
car trust receipts and also signed certain bailment leases.
In August of 1957 and some time prior thereto U.C.I.T.
advanced to the dealer, or on its behalf, pursuant to an
agreement for wholesale financing, dated December 31, 1954,
the sum of $437,972.84 for 201 new autos, each secured
under the terms of a new car trust receipt. On March
3, 1955, U.C.I.T. perfected its security interest in used
motor vehicle equipment, accessories or replacement parts
and proceeds by properly filing a financing statement under
the provisions of the Code. Prior to September 28, 1957,
110 of the new automobiles had been sold out of trust by the
dealer, leaving 91 new cars which U.C.I.T. repossessed and
sold for $188,268.52, leaving $2'49,704.52 due from the dealer
to U.C.I.T. for new cars sold out of trust.
Between September and October 1957, the dealer trans-
ferred to U.,C.I.T.. bank cash, shares of stock of Ford Motors,
customer's receivables, seventy used cars, motor parts and
92203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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accessories. These transfers were made by the dealer for
its past debts at a time when the debtor was insolvent and
U.C.I.T. had reasons so to believe. The trustee contended
that the transfer of all of these assets constituted preferences
within the meaning of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act
as the effect of the transfer was to enable U.C.I.T. to obtain
payment of a greater percentage of its debt than the dealer's
other unsecured creditors, except as to those items in which
U.C.T.T. had a perfected security interest.
With respect to the dealer's bank account in the sum
of 6,734.21 which was garnisheed under a writ of attach-
ment in favor of U.C.T.T., the court held that the lien
was obtained within four months of the bankruptcy while
the dealer was insolvent and therefore the attachment and
judgment were null and void as against the Trustee in
bankruptcy under Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act. The
court found that the bank account was not under the
control of U.C.I.T. and the source of the funds therein not
identified. U.C.I.T. was not able to trace any other money
in the bank to the sale by the trustee of collateral on which
the bank held a security interest. Although U.C.I.T. urged
that the money must have come from the sale of property
in which it had a security interest, the court said this
was an unwarranted assumption as the money could have
come from services rendered, loans, or the sale of the dealer's
own common stock. It could not assume the source of the
money in the bank. The burden was on U.O.T.T. to trace
the funds in the bank to the cash proceeds received by the
dealer from the disposition of the collateral. This was not
done. The cash was received by the dealer and deposited
more than ten days prior to the bankruptcy proceeding.
Hence, the funds were not identifiable cash proceeds received
from the sale or disposition of any collateral recoverable by
U.C.I.T. under section 9-306 pursuant to which the funds
were free from any security interest of U.C.I.T.
With respect to the shares of Ford stock transferred
within four months of the bankruptcy by the dealer to
U.C.I.T., the court held there was no tracing of proceeds
or funds from the disposition of collateral subject to the
security interest of U.C.I.T. to indicate where the moneys
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came to enable the dealer to purchase these shares of stock.
The shares of stock were not identifiable proceeds of any
security and accordingly the court held that the transfer of
the stock to U.O.T.T. was not subject to any security inter-
est and, having taken place within four months of bank-
ruptcy, was a voidable preference recoverable by the trustee
in bankruptcy under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
As to accounts receivable the court found that within
four months of the filing of the petition the dealer had
transferred customer's receivables by cash and checks to
U.O.I.T. in the sum of $10,847.75. Of this sum 51,100.00
was identified as cash proceeds from the sale of two new
cars on which U.O.I.T. had a perfected security interest,
leaving in dispute $9,747.75, which made up of commingled
cash proceeds arising from the sale of five cars, parts and
services.
The court found that it could not ascertain whether
any of the articles sold was covered by a perfected security
interest, and even if it were assumed that some of the
accounts arose from the sale of cars, it still could not
ascertain whether or not any portion of the accounts arose
from services rendered by the dealer, and as l..I.T. did not
hold a security interest in proceeds received from the sale
of services, it was not entitled to retain proceeds which
may have come from this source and, interpreting section
9-306 the court said:
[Als we understand the Uniform Commercial Code, in insolvency
proceedings the secured creditor is only entitled to commingled cash
when it is received as proceeds of collateral within ten days of
the filing of the petition. 3
For these reasons, the court held the trustee was entitled
to recover 9,747.75.
The court found that the eleven used vehicles were
financed by U.O.I.T. as evidenced by the used car trust
receipts; that it had obtained a security interest under the
agreement for wholesale financing covering new and used
merchandise, and the used car trust receipts. This security
93 Id. at 283.
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interest was perfected by the filing of the financing state-
ment in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth
and the Secretary of Allegheny County where the dealer
did business. The court held that U.C.I.T. had a valid
lien, stating that:
[Ilt seems certain that a finance company which advances money for
wholesale financing of new cars can perfect a valid security interest
therein by filing a financing statement in the office of the Secretary
of the Commonwealth-and the Prothonotary of the County in
which the dealer does business.91
Likewise, the court held that a lender could also perfect
a valid security interest in used cars by the same method
employed to perfect a security interest in new cars.
The court also stated that although $6,340.00 had been
advanced by U.C.I.T. on the eleven used cars, it was entitled
to retain the excess realized on the sale of the cars in the
sum of $1,465.00, as the cars realized the sum of $7,805.00,
in view of the provision in the agreement for financing, as
follows: "Until payment in full, the dealer will hold the
proceeds separately and in trust for you (U.C.I.T.) ."
The court said the documents provided, in substance,
that U.C.I.T. was to have a security interest in "trade-ins"
and that these cars were identifiable proceeds covered by
the financing statement. Further, it held that the finance
company had a perfected security interest in such proceeds,
good as against the trustee and that section 9-306 was
not in conflict with Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, and
the perfected security interest in the proceeds was enforceable
against the trustee.
The court found that the chattel mortgage and loan
agreement executed by the dealer created a security interest
in the dealet's inventory of all parts and accessories then
owned or which might thereafter be acquired, and that the
chattel mortgage specifically covered "our complete inventory
of all parts and accessories now owned or which may
hereafter be acquired," and the court held the security
interest was perfected when U.C.I.T. filed a financing
94 Id. at 284.
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statement in February of 1957, covering the replacement
parts and accessories for new and used cars.
The court further held that the description in the
financing statement was sufficient to effect a security interest
in these items, stating:
We find that the security agreements . . . and the Financing State-
ment reasonably identify the motor parts and accessories in Spohn's
(dealer) inventory, and that the description in the Financing State-
ment is sufficient to give notice to potential creditors. Therefore,
U.C.I.T. is entitled to retain the money received from the sale
of these items.95
You will note that this case covers the subject not only
as to the description and the sufficiency of a reasonable
description, the provision with respect to a security interest
in chattels to be acquired in the future, but also the various
phases of trust funds, tracing of trust funds and identifiable
proceeds and non-identifiable proceeds."
It will be observed that this case covers many of the
provisions of article 9 sustaining their validity as against
the trustee in bankruptcy and as against the provisions of
Sections 60, 67 and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.
It would appear that under the provisions of the Code,
security agreements providing for a security interest in
after-acquired property are good and valid as against a
trustee in bankruptcy; that the description of the collateral
need not be specific but general and reasonable enough to
describe sufficiently the same; that the right of the debtor
to commingle and use the proceeds of the collateral does
not destroy or render invalid the security interest but
merely diminishes the security available for the secured
creditor in the event of bankruptcy and that the secured
creditor is entitled to recover all proceeds that may be traced
or identifiable, as well as to recover funds derived from
the sale of collateral and not identifiable, deposited within
ten days of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
95 Id. at 287.
96Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Leply Ford, Inc.,(No. 1), supra note 81, (No. 2), supra note 87.
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It will be observed that the courts have adopted a
more liberal attitude with respect to the nature and suf-
ficiency of the description and if it reasonably identifies the
property, the financing statement will be held to be suf-
ficient and the security interest valid as against the trustee.
This decision is authority that, as to the provisions
of sections 9-108 and 9-204, the bankruptcy court will give
effect and uphold the validity of a security interest covering
after-acquired property.
Prior to the Code and under prior state legislation
as to chattels mortgages, the after-acquired clause was in-
effective and held void as against the trustee in bankruptcy.97
It will be observed that the court in Howarth also
sustained the validity of the security interest notwithstanding
the fact that the debtor had unfettered dominion and control
over the secured property and the proceeds thereof. Here
we have a clear-cut case where the debtor exercised the
right to sell the equipment and merchandise subject to
the security interest and use the same in the regular course
of conduct of business without policing and without segre-
gating the proceeds. However, it is to be noted that the
security interest, on bankruptcy, was limited to the property
at hand, so that the loss by reason of the use and disappear-
ance of the secured property was borne by the secured
creditor.
It is also to be noted that the court upheld the right
of the secured creditor to recover the proceeds deposited
and commingled in the bank account of the bankrupt within
ten days prior to the filing of the petition under the pro-
visions of section 9-306(4).
SUPREMACY OF THE BANKRUPToY ACT OvER TH-n CoDE
In the case of In re Laskin, 98 the question presented to
the court was the right of the trustee to offer proof as
evidence outside the note with respect to the execution
and the parties liable thereon. The Pennsylvania Uniform
Commercial Code provides that evidence outside the note
is not admissible. The trustee sought to show that the
97 Eberly v. Dudley, 314 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1962).
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bankrupt was not personally liable on the note which had
been executed by him, but did not indicate on its face
that it had been executed in a representative capacity
on behalf of the corporation. The district court held that
in case of a conflict between the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act prevail and supersede the provisions
of the Code. The court held that the bankruptcy court
was a court of equity; that the referee was not estopped
from receiving the evidence of circumstances outside the note
and sifting the circumstances under which the note was
executed and from the evidence produced to reject the claim
asserted against the estate, on the ground that it had not
been executed by the bankrupt personally but only in a
representative capacity, on behalf of the corporation.
In the absence of bankruptcy, the provisions of the
Code would be binding.99
In the case of In re Mort Co.,1' a C.O.D. sale was
made, against which the buyer issued his check with suf-
ficient monies in his bank account to pay the check. Two
days later the buyer went into bankruptcy and thereafter
when the check was presented for payment the bank refused
to pay the same. Upon the seller's application in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding to reclaim the sales price represented by
the amount of the check, the court held that under the
provisions of the Code- section 2-507(2) -the sale was
not on credit but on condition of payment, so that the seller
had the right to reclaim and, as there were sufficient monies
in the bank to cover the check, the seller was entitled to
recover the proceeds of the check.
Limitation of Right of Reclamation-Sections 2-702, 2-703,
2-403, 9-301 and 2-326(2)
Under the Pennsylvania Code, as originally enacted,
the trustee was in the position of a lien creditor, and in
the case of In re Kravit °,' 1 the trustee prevailed even
98204 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963).
99 Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., - Mass -, 187 N.E.2d
669 (1963).
100 208 F. Suipp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
1o 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
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against the reclaiming creditor who had delivered the
merchandise within ten days of the filing of the petition,
on the theory that the reclaiming creditor could not prevail
over a lien creditor, and as the trustee was in the position
of a lien creditor, the trustee prevailed over the reclaiming
creditor.
The New York and Illinois Codes contain a modification
of the Pennsylvania Code eliminating from section 2-703
the words "lien creditor" so, that the creditor has the right
to reclaim even as against the trustee where the delivery
is made within ten days of insolvency.
Rights as Between Successive Secured Creditors
In Thompson v. 0. f. Scott Credit Corp.,"2 the first
secured creditor perfected a security interest in after-
acquired inventory of a business conducted as a partnership
under a fictitious name, and in filing the financing statement
did not name the assumed name of the business but named
the individual partners as the debtors.
Later, the second secured creditor furnished inventory
under a purchase money security interest and filed a
financing statement giving the fictitious name of the partner-
ship. The second secured creditor did not give notice to
the first that he was furnishing inventory under a purchase
money security interest, as required by section !312 (3).
In the ensuing suit involving the conflicting claims to the
inventory between the first secured creditor, under the
amplified property clause in his financing statement, and
the second secured creditor under the purchase money
security interest, the court held that the second secured
creditor knew the business was conducted under a fictitious
name, and that the filing of the certificate by the first secured
creditor was a matter of public record, which contained the
actual names of the partners, and that the second security
creditor should have checked the financing statement against
10228 Pa. D. & C. 2d 85 (Chester County Ct. 1962), where the security
interest was not perfected within ten days and the rights of an innocent pur-
chaser intervened, the purchaser prevailed over the secured creditor.
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the name of the individual partners, which would have
prompted the giving of notice to the first security creditor.
The failure of the second security creditor to give notice
to the first lost to the second security creditor the priority
to which he might have been entitled, holding that the
first security creditor had acted properly in filing the
financing statement naming the individual partners, and
under section 9-312(5) (a) entitled him to priority as the
second creditor failed to give notice to the first as required
by the Code.
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code effects many changes in
the status of secured obligations. It simplifies the documents
to be executed to evidence a secured interest. All that is
required is the, agreement between the parties and the
execution of a simple financing statement indicating the
collateral which may include not only accounts receivable,
furniture, fixtures, machinery and equipment, but inventory,
including a shifting stock of inventory, as well as the
proceeds realized from the sale of the inventory.
The Code will permit the creation of a security
interest that covers not only property in being but after-
acquired property.
A major change is the elimination of the Benedict v.
Riatner rule which so frequently invalidated security ar-
rangements upon the ground that the debtor had retained
dominion and control over the collateral.
These provisions of the Code have been sustained as
against a trustee in bankruptcy. It is to be hoped that
these decisions will be followed in all jurisdictions so that
there may be a more liberal interpretation of the provisions
of the Code in order to afford greater protection to the
secured creditor in the ever expanding business growth
of the country.
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